2016-11-15 17:56:29 +02:00
|
|
|
# frozen_string_literal: true
|
2023-02-20 07:58:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-05-02 03:14:47 +03:00
|
|
|
# == Schema Information
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Table name: users
|
|
|
|
#
|
2018-04-23 12:29:17 +03:00
|
|
|
# id :bigint(8) not null, primary key
|
2017-05-02 03:14:47 +03:00
|
|
|
# email :string default(""), not null
|
|
|
|
# created_at :datetime not null
|
|
|
|
# updated_at :datetime not null
|
|
|
|
# encrypted_password :string default(""), not null
|
|
|
|
# reset_password_token :string
|
|
|
|
# reset_password_sent_at :datetime
|
|
|
|
# sign_in_count :integer default(0), not null
|
|
|
|
# current_sign_in_at :datetime
|
|
|
|
# last_sign_in_at :datetime
|
2017-07-13 04:12:25 +03:00
|
|
|
# admin :boolean default(FALSE), not null
|
2017-05-02 03:14:47 +03:00
|
|
|
# confirmation_token :string
|
|
|
|
# confirmed_at :datetime
|
|
|
|
# confirmation_sent_at :datetime
|
|
|
|
# unconfirmed_email :string
|
|
|
|
# locale :string
|
|
|
|
# encrypted_otp_secret :string
|
|
|
|
# encrypted_otp_secret_iv :string
|
|
|
|
# encrypted_otp_secret_salt :string
|
|
|
|
# consumed_timestep :integer
|
2017-07-13 04:12:25 +03:00
|
|
|
# otp_required_for_login :boolean default(FALSE), not null
|
2017-05-02 03:14:47 +03:00
|
|
|
# last_emailed_at :datetime
|
|
|
|
# otp_backup_codes :string is an Array
|
2018-04-23 12:29:17 +03:00
|
|
|
# account_id :bigint(8) not null
|
2017-11-07 20:06:44 +02:00
|
|
|
# disabled :boolean default(FALSE), not null
|
2017-11-11 21:23:33 +02:00
|
|
|
# moderator :boolean default(FALSE), not null
|
2018-04-23 12:29:17 +03:00
|
|
|
# invite_id :bigint(8)
|
2018-06-17 14:54:02 +03:00
|
|
|
# chosen_languages :string is an Array
|
2018-12-24 20:12:38 +02:00
|
|
|
# created_by_application_id :bigint(8)
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
# approved :boolean default(TRUE), not null
|
2020-06-09 11:23:06 +03:00
|
|
|
# sign_in_token :string
|
|
|
|
# sign_in_token_sent_at :datetime
|
Add WebAuthn as an alternative 2FA method (#14466)
* feat: add possibility of adding WebAuthn security keys to use as 2FA
This adds a basic UI for enabling WebAuthn 2FA. We did a little refactor
to the Settings page for editing the 2FA methods – now it will list the
methods that are available to the user (TOTP and WebAuthn) and from
there they'll be able to add or remove any of them.
Also, it's worth mentioning that for enabling WebAuthn it's required to
have TOTP enabled, so the first time that you go to the 2FA Settings
page, you'll be asked to set it up.
This work was inspired by the one donde by Github in their platform, and
despite it could be approached in different ways, we decided to go with
this one given that we feel that this gives a great UX.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add request for WebAuthn as second factor at login if enabled
This commits adds the feature for using WebAuthn as a second factor for
login when enabled.
If users have WebAuthn enabled, now a page requesting for the use of a
WebAuthn credential for log in will appear, although a link redirecting
to the old page for logging in using a two-factor code will also be
present.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add possibility of deleting WebAuthn Credentials
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: disable WebAuthn when an Admin disables 2FA for a user
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: remove ability to disable TOTP leaving only WebAuthn as 2FA
Following examples form other platforms like Github, we decided to make
Webauthn 2FA secondary to 2FA with TOTP, so that we removed the
possibility of removing TOTP authentication only, leaving users with
just WEbAuthn as 2FA. Instead, users will have to click on 'Disable 2FA'
in order to remove second factor auth.
The reason for WebAuthn being secondary to TOPT is that in that way,
users will still be able to log in using their code from their phone's
application if they don't have their security keys with them – or maybe
even lost them.
* We had to change a little the flow for setting up TOTP, given that now
it's possible to setting up again if you already had TOTP, in order to
let users modify their authenticator app – given that now it's not
possible for them to disable TOTP and set it up again with another
authenticator app.
So, basically, now instead of storing the new `otp_secret` in the
user, we store it in the session until the process of set up is
finished.
This was because, as it was before, when users clicked on 'Edit' in
the new two-factor methods lists page, but then went back without
finishing the flow, their `otp_secret` had been changed therefore
invalidating their previous authenticator app, making them unable to
log in again using TOTP.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* refactor: fix eslint errors
The PR build was failing given that linting returning some errors.
This commit attempts to fix them.
* refactor: normalize i18n translations
The build was failing given that i18n translations files were not
normalized.
This commits fixes that.
* refactor: avoid having the webauthn gem locked to a specific version
* refactor: use symbols for routes without '/'
* refactor: avoid sending webauthn disabled email when 2FA is disabled
When an admins disable 2FA for users, we were sending two mails
to them, one notifying that 2FA was disabled and the other to notify
that WebAuthn was disabled.
As the second one is redundant since the first email includes it, we can
remove it and send just one email to users.
* refactor: avoid creating new env variable for webauthn_origin config
* refactor: improve flash error messages for webauthn pages
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
2020-08-24 17:46:27 +03:00
|
|
|
# webauthn_id :string
|
2020-10-12 17:33:49 +03:00
|
|
|
# sign_up_ip :inet
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
# role_id :bigint(8)
|
2023-03-30 15:44:00 +03:00
|
|
|
# settings :text
|
2023-06-10 04:29:37 +03:00
|
|
|
# time_zone :string
|
2017-05-02 03:14:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#
|
2016-11-15 17:56:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-17 18:56:23 +03:00
|
|
|
class User < ApplicationRecord
|
2023-03-30 15:44:00 +03:00
|
|
|
self.ignored_columns += %w(
|
2022-01-23 16:46:30 +02:00
|
|
|
remember_created_at
|
|
|
|
remember_token
|
2022-02-01 21:57:39 +02:00
|
|
|
current_sign_in_ip
|
|
|
|
last_sign_in_ip
|
2022-04-06 21:58:12 +03:00
|
|
|
skip_sign_in_token
|
2022-05-27 21:05:22 +03:00
|
|
|
filtered_languages
|
2022-01-23 16:46:30 +02:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-16 20:13:36 +03:00
|
|
|
include LanguagesHelper
|
2023-12-01 13:00:41 +02:00
|
|
|
include Redisable
|
|
|
|
include User::HasSettings
|
|
|
|
include User::LdapAuthenticable
|
|
|
|
include User::Omniauthable
|
|
|
|
include User::PamAuthenticable
|
2017-11-07 20:06:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-19 04:50:34 +03:00
|
|
|
# The home and list feeds will be stored in Redis for this amount
|
|
|
|
# of time, and status fan-out to followers will include only people
|
|
|
|
# within this time frame. Lowering the duration may improve performance
|
|
|
|
# if lots of people sign up, but not a lot of them check their feed
|
|
|
|
# every day. Raising the duration reduces the amount of expensive
|
|
|
|
# RegenerationWorker jobs that need to be run when those people come
|
|
|
|
# to check their feed
|
2019-01-02 11:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
ACTIVE_DURATION = ENV.fetch('USER_ACTIVE_DAYS', 7).to_i.days.freeze
|
2017-01-12 21:46:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-02 17:55:00 +02:00
|
|
|
devise :two_factor_authenticatable,
|
2018-03-04 21:28:24 +02:00
|
|
|
otp_secret_encryption_key: Rails.configuration.x.otp_secret
|
2018-01-02 17:55:00 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
devise :two_factor_backupable,
|
2017-04-15 14:26:03 +03:00
|
|
|
otp_number_of_backup_codes: 10
|
2016-03-05 14:12:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-06 01:13:58 +02:00
|
|
|
devise :registerable, :recoverable, :validatable,
|
2018-01-02 17:55:00 +02:00
|
|
|
:confirmable
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-19 21:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
belongs_to :account, inverse_of: :user
|
|
|
|
belongs_to :invite, counter_cache: :uses, optional: true
|
2018-12-24 20:12:38 +02:00
|
|
|
belongs_to :created_by_application, class_name: 'Doorkeeper::Application', optional: true
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
belongs_to :role, class_name: 'UserRole', optional: true
|
2016-03-05 23:43:05 +02:00
|
|
|
accepts_nested_attributes_for :account
|
2016-03-05 14:12:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-12-01 17:52:47 +02:00
|
|
|
has_many :applications, class_name: 'Doorkeeper::Application', as: :owner, dependent: nil
|
|
|
|
has_many :backups, inverse_of: :user, dependent: nil
|
|
|
|
has_many :invites, inverse_of: :user, dependent: nil
|
2019-09-06 14:55:51 +03:00
|
|
|
has_many :markers, inverse_of: :user, dependent: :destroy
|
Add WebAuthn as an alternative 2FA method (#14466)
* feat: add possibility of adding WebAuthn security keys to use as 2FA
This adds a basic UI for enabling WebAuthn 2FA. We did a little refactor
to the Settings page for editing the 2FA methods – now it will list the
methods that are available to the user (TOTP and WebAuthn) and from
there they'll be able to add or remove any of them.
Also, it's worth mentioning that for enabling WebAuthn it's required to
have TOTP enabled, so the first time that you go to the 2FA Settings
page, you'll be asked to set it up.
This work was inspired by the one donde by Github in their platform, and
despite it could be approached in different ways, we decided to go with
this one given that we feel that this gives a great UX.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add request for WebAuthn as second factor at login if enabled
This commits adds the feature for using WebAuthn as a second factor for
login when enabled.
If users have WebAuthn enabled, now a page requesting for the use of a
WebAuthn credential for log in will appear, although a link redirecting
to the old page for logging in using a two-factor code will also be
present.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add possibility of deleting WebAuthn Credentials
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: disable WebAuthn when an Admin disables 2FA for a user
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: remove ability to disable TOTP leaving only WebAuthn as 2FA
Following examples form other platforms like Github, we decided to make
Webauthn 2FA secondary to 2FA with TOTP, so that we removed the
possibility of removing TOTP authentication only, leaving users with
just WEbAuthn as 2FA. Instead, users will have to click on 'Disable 2FA'
in order to remove second factor auth.
The reason for WebAuthn being secondary to TOPT is that in that way,
users will still be able to log in using their code from their phone's
application if they don't have their security keys with them – or maybe
even lost them.
* We had to change a little the flow for setting up TOTP, given that now
it's possible to setting up again if you already had TOTP, in order to
let users modify their authenticator app – given that now it's not
possible for them to disable TOTP and set it up again with another
authenticator app.
So, basically, now instead of storing the new `otp_secret` in the
user, we store it in the session until the process of set up is
finished.
This was because, as it was before, when users clicked on 'Edit' in
the new two-factor methods lists page, but then went back without
finishing the flow, their `otp_secret` had been changed therefore
invalidating their previous authenticator app, making them unable to
log in again using TOTP.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* refactor: fix eslint errors
The PR build was failing given that linting returning some errors.
This commit attempts to fix them.
* refactor: normalize i18n translations
The build was failing given that i18n translations files were not
normalized.
This commits fixes that.
* refactor: avoid having the webauthn gem locked to a specific version
* refactor: use symbols for routes without '/'
* refactor: avoid sending webauthn disabled email when 2FA is disabled
When an admins disable 2FA for users, we were sending two mails
to them, one notifying that 2FA was disabled and the other to notify
that WebAuthn was disabled.
As the second one is redundant since the first email includes it, we can
remove it and send just one email to users.
* refactor: avoid creating new env variable for webauthn_origin config
* refactor: improve flash error messages for webauthn pages
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
2020-08-24 17:46:27 +03:00
|
|
|
has_many :webauthn_credentials, dependent: :destroy
|
2023-12-01 17:52:47 +02:00
|
|
|
has_many :ips, class_name: 'UserIp', inverse_of: :user, dependent: nil
|
2017-08-22 19:33:57 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-09 17:06:30 +03:00
|
|
|
has_one :invite_request, class_name: 'UserInviteRequest', inverse_of: :user, dependent: :destroy
|
2020-12-14 11:03:09 +02:00
|
|
|
accepts_nested_attributes_for :invite_request, reject_if: ->(attributes) { attributes['text'].blank? && !Setting.require_invite_text }
|
2020-12-22 18:14:32 +02:00
|
|
|
validates :invite_request, presence: true, on: :create, if: :invite_text_required?
|
2019-04-09 17:06:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-25 05:31:10 +03:00
|
|
|
validates_with BlacklistedEmailValidator, if: -> { ENV['EMAIL_DOMAIN_LISTS_APPLY_AFTER_CONFIRMATION'] == 'true' || !confirmed? }
|
2018-12-10 23:53:25 +02:00
|
|
|
validates_with EmailMxValidator, if: :validate_email_dns?
|
2018-12-24 20:12:38 +02:00
|
|
|
validates :agreement, acceptance: { allow_nil: false, accept: [true, 'true', '1'] }, on: :create
|
2016-03-14 18:49:13 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-30 15:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
# Honeypot/anti-spam fields
|
2020-12-10 07:27:26 +02:00
|
|
|
attr_accessor :registration_form_time, :website, :confirm_password
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
validates_with RegistrationFormTimeValidator, on: :create
|
|
|
|
validates :website, absence: true, on: :create
|
|
|
|
validates :confirm_password, absence: true, on: :create
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
validate :validate_role_elevation
|
2020-12-10 07:27:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-11 21:23:33 +02:00
|
|
|
scope :recent, -> { order(id: :desc) }
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
scope :pending, -> { where(approved: false) }
|
|
|
|
scope :approved, -> { where(approved: true) }
|
2017-03-04 00:45:48 +02:00
|
|
|
scope :confirmed, -> { where.not(confirmed_at: nil) }
|
2019-01-02 11:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
scope :enabled, -> { where(disabled: false) }
|
2019-06-20 03:52:34 +03:00
|
|
|
scope :disabled, -> { where(disabled: true) }
|
2017-05-22 20:36:21 +03:00
|
|
|
scope :inactive, -> { where(arel_table[:current_sign_in_at].lt(ACTIVE_DURATION.ago)) }
|
2019-06-18 19:22:02 +03:00
|
|
|
scope :active, -> { confirmed.where(arel_table[:current_sign_in_at].gteq(ACTIVE_DURATION.ago)).joins(:account).where(accounts: { suspended_at: nil }) }
|
2017-05-22 22:50:58 +03:00
|
|
|
scope :matches_email, ->(value) { where(arel_table[:email].matches("#{value}%")) }
|
2022-02-13 02:58:26 +02:00
|
|
|
scope :matches_ip, ->(value) { left_joins(:ips).where('user_ips.ip <<= ?', value).group('users.id') }
|
2016-10-07 14:17:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
before_validation :sanitize_role
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
before_create :set_approved
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
after_commit :send_pending_devise_notifications
|
2022-06-09 22:57:36 +03:00
|
|
|
after_create_commit :trigger_webhooks
|
2017-05-08 04:32:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2024-01-10 15:36:06 +02:00
|
|
|
normalizes :locale, with: ->(locale) { I18n.available_locales.exclude?(locale.to_sym) ? nil : locale }
|
|
|
|
normalizes :time_zone, with: ->(time_zone) { ActiveSupport::TimeZone[time_zone].nil? ? nil : time_zone }
|
|
|
|
normalizes :chosen_languages, with: ->(chosen_languages) { chosen_languages.compact_blank.presence }
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-01 21:53:37 +03:00
|
|
|
# This avoids a deprecation warning from Rails 5.1
|
|
|
|
# It seems possible that a future release of devise-two-factor will
|
|
|
|
# handle this itself, and this can be removed from our User class.
|
|
|
|
attribute :otp_secret
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-23 19:50:53 +03:00
|
|
|
has_many :session_activations, dependent: :destroy
|
|
|
|
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
delegate :can?, to: :role
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-06 21:58:12 +03:00
|
|
|
attr_reader :invite_code
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
attr_writer :external, :bypass_invite_request_check, :current_account
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def self.those_who_can(*any_of_privileges)
|
|
|
|
matching_role_ids = UserRole.that_can(*any_of_privileges).map(&:id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if matching_role_ids.empty?
|
|
|
|
none
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
where(role_id: matching_role_ids)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def role
|
|
|
|
if role_id.nil?
|
|
|
|
UserRole.everyone
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
super
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
2017-11-27 17:07:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-23 05:43:42 +03:00
|
|
|
def confirmed?
|
|
|
|
confirmed_at.present?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-28 04:38:41 +02:00
|
|
|
def invited?
|
2019-05-19 22:40:36 +03:00
|
|
|
invite_id.present?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def valid_invitation?
|
2019-05-02 05:30:12 +03:00
|
|
|
invite_id.present? && invite.valid_for_use?
|
2018-12-28 04:38:41 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-07 20:06:44 +02:00
|
|
|
def disable!
|
2020-01-25 06:22:35 +02:00
|
|
|
update!(disabled: true)
|
2017-11-07 20:06:44 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def enable!
|
|
|
|
update!(disabled: false)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-25 21:39:40 +03:00
|
|
|
def to_log_human_identifier
|
|
|
|
account.acct
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def to_log_route_param
|
|
|
|
account_id
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
def confirm
|
2019-03-23 03:23:48 +02:00
|
|
|
new_user = !confirmed?
|
2024-01-15 13:06:48 +02:00
|
|
|
self.approved = true if grant_approval_on_confirmation?
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
super
|
2019-03-14 03:13:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-24 20:40:21 +02:00
|
|
|
if new_user
|
|
|
|
# Avoid extremely unlikely race condition when approving and confirming
|
|
|
|
# the user at the same time
|
|
|
|
reload unless approved?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if approved?
|
|
|
|
prepare_new_user!
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
notify_staff_about_pending_account!
|
|
|
|
end
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-11 21:23:33 +02:00
|
|
|
def confirm!
|
2019-03-23 03:23:48 +02:00
|
|
|
new_user = !confirmed?
|
2024-01-15 13:06:48 +02:00
|
|
|
self.approved = true if grant_approval_on_confirmation?
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-11 21:23:33 +02:00
|
|
|
skip_confirmation!
|
|
|
|
save!
|
2019-03-14 03:13:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-01-24 20:40:21 +02:00
|
|
|
if new_user
|
|
|
|
# Avoid extremely unlikely race condition when approving and confirming
|
|
|
|
# the user at the same time
|
|
|
|
reload unless approved?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
prepare_new_user! if approved?
|
|
|
|
end
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-16 14:23:50 +02:00
|
|
|
def update_sign_in!(new_sign_in: false)
|
2022-06-09 22:57:36 +03:00
|
|
|
old_current = current_sign_in_at
|
|
|
|
new_current = Time.now.utc
|
|
|
|
|
2020-11-13 00:05:01 +02:00
|
|
|
self.last_sign_in_at = old_current || new_current
|
|
|
|
self.current_sign_in_at = new_current
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if new_sign_in
|
|
|
|
self.sign_in_count ||= 0
|
|
|
|
self.sign_in_count += 1
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
save(validate: false) unless new_record?
|
|
|
|
prepare_returning_user!
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def pending?
|
|
|
|
!approved?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def active_for_authentication?
|
2020-09-15 15:37:58 +03:00
|
|
|
!account.memorial?
|
Change unconfirmed user login behaviour (#11375)
Allow access to account settings, 2FA, authorized applications, and
account deletions to unconfirmed and pending users, as well as
users who had their accounts disabled. Suspended users cannot update
their e-mail or password or delete their account.
Display account status on account settings page, for example, when
an account is frozen, limited, unconfirmed or pending review.
After sign up, login users straight away and show a simple page that
tells them the status of their account with links to account settings
and logout, to reduce onboarding friction and allow users to correct
wrongly typed e-mail addresses.
Move the final sign-up step of SSO integrations to be the same
as above to reduce code duplication.
2019-07-22 11:48:50 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def functional?
|
2022-11-17 11:55:23 +02:00
|
|
|
functional_or_moved? && account.moved_to_account_id.nil?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def functional_or_moved?
|
2023-11-30 17:43:26 +02:00
|
|
|
confirmed? && approved? && !disabled? && !account.unavailable? && !account.memorial?
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-26 03:53:13 +02:00
|
|
|
def unconfirmed?
|
|
|
|
!confirmed?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-11 17:32:44 +03:00
|
|
|
def unconfirmed_or_pending?
|
2022-03-26 03:53:13 +02:00
|
|
|
unconfirmed? || pending?
|
2019-09-11 17:32:44 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def inactive_message
|
2023-02-08 08:07:36 +02:00
|
|
|
approved? ? super : :pending
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def approve!
|
|
|
|
return if approved?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
update!(approved: true)
|
2023-01-24 20:40:21 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Avoid extremely unlikely race condition when approving and confirming
|
|
|
|
# the user at the same time
|
|
|
|
reload unless confirmed?
|
|
|
|
prepare_new_user! if confirmed?
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
Add WebAuthn as an alternative 2FA method (#14466)
* feat: add possibility of adding WebAuthn security keys to use as 2FA
This adds a basic UI for enabling WebAuthn 2FA. We did a little refactor
to the Settings page for editing the 2FA methods – now it will list the
methods that are available to the user (TOTP and WebAuthn) and from
there they'll be able to add or remove any of them.
Also, it's worth mentioning that for enabling WebAuthn it's required to
have TOTP enabled, so the first time that you go to the 2FA Settings
page, you'll be asked to set it up.
This work was inspired by the one donde by Github in their platform, and
despite it could be approached in different ways, we decided to go with
this one given that we feel that this gives a great UX.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add request for WebAuthn as second factor at login if enabled
This commits adds the feature for using WebAuthn as a second factor for
login when enabled.
If users have WebAuthn enabled, now a page requesting for the use of a
WebAuthn credential for log in will appear, although a link redirecting
to the old page for logging in using a two-factor code will also be
present.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add possibility of deleting WebAuthn Credentials
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: disable WebAuthn when an Admin disables 2FA for a user
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: remove ability to disable TOTP leaving only WebAuthn as 2FA
Following examples form other platforms like Github, we decided to make
Webauthn 2FA secondary to 2FA with TOTP, so that we removed the
possibility of removing TOTP authentication only, leaving users with
just WEbAuthn as 2FA. Instead, users will have to click on 'Disable 2FA'
in order to remove second factor auth.
The reason for WebAuthn being secondary to TOPT is that in that way,
users will still be able to log in using their code from their phone's
application if they don't have their security keys with them – or maybe
even lost them.
* We had to change a little the flow for setting up TOTP, given that now
it's possible to setting up again if you already had TOTP, in order to
let users modify their authenticator app – given that now it's not
possible for them to disable TOTP and set it up again with another
authenticator app.
So, basically, now instead of storing the new `otp_secret` in the
user, we store it in the session until the process of set up is
finished.
This was because, as it was before, when users clicked on 'Edit' in
the new two-factor methods lists page, but then went back without
finishing the flow, their `otp_secret` had been changed therefore
invalidating their previous authenticator app, making them unable to
log in again using TOTP.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* refactor: fix eslint errors
The PR build was failing given that linting returning some errors.
This commit attempts to fix them.
* refactor: normalize i18n translations
The build was failing given that i18n translations files were not
normalized.
This commits fixes that.
* refactor: avoid having the webauthn gem locked to a specific version
* refactor: use symbols for routes without '/'
* refactor: avoid sending webauthn disabled email when 2FA is disabled
When an admins disable 2FA for users, we were sending two mails
to them, one notifying that 2FA was disabled and the other to notify
that WebAuthn was disabled.
As the second one is redundant since the first email includes it, we can
remove it and send just one email to users.
* refactor: avoid creating new env variable for webauthn_origin config
* refactor: improve flash error messages for webauthn pages
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
2020-08-24 17:46:27 +03:00
|
|
|
def otp_enabled?
|
|
|
|
otp_required_for_login
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def webauthn_enabled?
|
|
|
|
webauthn_credentials.any?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def two_factor_enabled?
|
|
|
|
otp_required_for_login? || webauthn_credentials.any?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-02 22:07:12 +03:00
|
|
|
def disable_two_factor!
|
|
|
|
self.otp_required_for_login = false
|
Add WebAuthn as an alternative 2FA method (#14466)
* feat: add possibility of adding WebAuthn security keys to use as 2FA
This adds a basic UI for enabling WebAuthn 2FA. We did a little refactor
to the Settings page for editing the 2FA methods – now it will list the
methods that are available to the user (TOTP and WebAuthn) and from
there they'll be able to add or remove any of them.
Also, it's worth mentioning that for enabling WebAuthn it's required to
have TOTP enabled, so the first time that you go to the 2FA Settings
page, you'll be asked to set it up.
This work was inspired by the one donde by Github in their platform, and
despite it could be approached in different ways, we decided to go with
this one given that we feel that this gives a great UX.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add request for WebAuthn as second factor at login if enabled
This commits adds the feature for using WebAuthn as a second factor for
login when enabled.
If users have WebAuthn enabled, now a page requesting for the use of a
WebAuthn credential for log in will appear, although a link redirecting
to the old page for logging in using a two-factor code will also be
present.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add possibility of deleting WebAuthn Credentials
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: disable WebAuthn when an Admin disables 2FA for a user
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: remove ability to disable TOTP leaving only WebAuthn as 2FA
Following examples form other platforms like Github, we decided to make
Webauthn 2FA secondary to 2FA with TOTP, so that we removed the
possibility of removing TOTP authentication only, leaving users with
just WEbAuthn as 2FA. Instead, users will have to click on 'Disable 2FA'
in order to remove second factor auth.
The reason for WebAuthn being secondary to TOPT is that in that way,
users will still be able to log in using their code from their phone's
application if they don't have their security keys with them – or maybe
even lost them.
* We had to change a little the flow for setting up TOTP, given that now
it's possible to setting up again if you already had TOTP, in order to
let users modify their authenticator app – given that now it's not
possible for them to disable TOTP and set it up again with another
authenticator app.
So, basically, now instead of storing the new `otp_secret` in the
user, we store it in the session until the process of set up is
finished.
This was because, as it was before, when users clicked on 'Edit' in
the new two-factor methods lists page, but then went back without
finishing the flow, their `otp_secret` had been changed therefore
invalidating their previous authenticator app, making them unable to
log in again using TOTP.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* refactor: fix eslint errors
The PR build was failing given that linting returning some errors.
This commit attempts to fix them.
* refactor: normalize i18n translations
The build was failing given that i18n translations files were not
normalized.
This commits fixes that.
* refactor: avoid having the webauthn gem locked to a specific version
* refactor: use symbols for routes without '/'
* refactor: avoid sending webauthn disabled email when 2FA is disabled
When an admins disable 2FA for users, we were sending two mails
to them, one notifying that 2FA was disabled and the other to notify
that WebAuthn was disabled.
As the second one is redundant since the first email includes it, we can
remove it and send just one email to users.
* refactor: avoid creating new env variable for webauthn_origin config
* refactor: improve flash error messages for webauthn pages
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
2020-08-24 17:46:27 +03:00
|
|
|
self.otp_secret = nil
|
2017-05-02 22:07:12 +03:00
|
|
|
otp_backup_codes&.clear
|
Add WebAuthn as an alternative 2FA method (#14466)
* feat: add possibility of adding WebAuthn security keys to use as 2FA
This adds a basic UI for enabling WebAuthn 2FA. We did a little refactor
to the Settings page for editing the 2FA methods – now it will list the
methods that are available to the user (TOTP and WebAuthn) and from
there they'll be able to add or remove any of them.
Also, it's worth mentioning that for enabling WebAuthn it's required to
have TOTP enabled, so the first time that you go to the 2FA Settings
page, you'll be asked to set it up.
This work was inspired by the one donde by Github in their platform, and
despite it could be approached in different ways, we decided to go with
this one given that we feel that this gives a great UX.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add request for WebAuthn as second factor at login if enabled
This commits adds the feature for using WebAuthn as a second factor for
login when enabled.
If users have WebAuthn enabled, now a page requesting for the use of a
WebAuthn credential for log in will appear, although a link redirecting
to the old page for logging in using a two-factor code will also be
present.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: add possibility of deleting WebAuthn Credentials
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: disable WebAuthn when an Admin disables 2FA for a user
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* feat: remove ability to disable TOTP leaving only WebAuthn as 2FA
Following examples form other platforms like Github, we decided to make
Webauthn 2FA secondary to 2FA with TOTP, so that we removed the
possibility of removing TOTP authentication only, leaving users with
just WEbAuthn as 2FA. Instead, users will have to click on 'Disable 2FA'
in order to remove second factor auth.
The reason for WebAuthn being secondary to TOPT is that in that way,
users will still be able to log in using their code from their phone's
application if they don't have their security keys with them – or maybe
even lost them.
* We had to change a little the flow for setting up TOTP, given that now
it's possible to setting up again if you already had TOTP, in order to
let users modify their authenticator app – given that now it's not
possible for them to disable TOTP and set it up again with another
authenticator app.
So, basically, now instead of storing the new `otp_secret` in the
user, we store it in the session until the process of set up is
finished.
This was because, as it was before, when users clicked on 'Edit' in
the new two-factor methods lists page, but then went back without
finishing the flow, their `otp_secret` had been changed therefore
invalidating their previous authenticator app, making them unable to
log in again using TOTP.
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
* refactor: fix eslint errors
The PR build was failing given that linting returning some errors.
This commit attempts to fix them.
* refactor: normalize i18n translations
The build was failing given that i18n translations files were not
normalized.
This commits fixes that.
* refactor: avoid having the webauthn gem locked to a specific version
* refactor: use symbols for routes without '/'
* refactor: avoid sending webauthn disabled email when 2FA is disabled
When an admins disable 2FA for users, we were sending two mails
to them, one notifying that 2FA was disabled and the other to notify
that WebAuthn was disabled.
As the second one is redundant since the first email includes it, we can
remove it and send just one email to users.
* refactor: avoid creating new env variable for webauthn_origin config
* refactor: improve flash error messages for webauthn pages
Co-authored-by: Facundo Padula <facundo.padula@cedarcode.com>
2020-08-24 17:46:27 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
webauthn_credentials.destroy_all if webauthn_enabled?
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-02 22:07:12 +03:00
|
|
|
save!
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-16 14:23:50 +02:00
|
|
|
def token_for_app(app)
|
|
|
|
return nil if app.nil? || app.owner != self
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Doorkeeper::AccessToken.find_or_create_by(application_id: app.id, resource_owner_id: id) do |t|
|
|
|
|
t.scopes = app.scopes
|
|
|
|
t.expires_in = Doorkeeper.configuration.access_token_expires_in
|
2017-08-22 19:33:57 +03:00
|
|
|
t.use_refresh_token = Doorkeeper.configuration.refresh_token_enabled?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-25 17:54:30 +03:00
|
|
|
def activate_session(request)
|
2022-01-16 14:23:50 +02:00
|
|
|
session_activations.activate(
|
|
|
|
session_id: SecureRandom.hex,
|
|
|
|
user_agent: request.user_agent,
|
|
|
|
ip: request.remote_ip
|
|
|
|
).session_id
|
2017-06-23 19:50:53 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-24 01:20:38 +02:00
|
|
|
def clear_other_sessions(id)
|
2017-06-23 19:50:53 +03:00
|
|
|
session_activations.exclusive(id)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-13 23:15:32 +03:00
|
|
|
def web_push_subscription(session)
|
2018-05-11 12:49:12 +03:00
|
|
|
session.web_push_subscription.nil? ? nil : session.web_push_subscription
|
2017-07-13 23:15:32 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-27 17:07:59 +02:00
|
|
|
def invite_code=(code)
|
2018-08-26 20:22:46 +03:00
|
|
|
self.invite = Invite.find_by(code: code) if code.present?
|
2017-11-27 17:07:59 +02:00
|
|
|
@invite_code = code
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-02 11:18:55 +02:00
|
|
|
def password_required?
|
2019-09-18 17:37:27 +03:00
|
|
|
return false if external?
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-02 11:18:55 +02:00
|
|
|
super
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 11:23:06 +03:00
|
|
|
def external_or_valid_password?(compare_password)
|
|
|
|
# If encrypted_password is blank, we got the user from LDAP or PAM,
|
|
|
|
# so credentials are already valid
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encrypted_password.blank? || valid_password?(compare_password)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-02 11:18:55 +02:00
|
|
|
def send_reset_password_instructions
|
2019-09-18 17:37:27 +03:00
|
|
|
return false if encrypted_password.blank?
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-02 11:18:55 +02:00
|
|
|
super
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-08 06:31:28 +03:00
|
|
|
def reset_password(new_password, new_password_confirmation)
|
2019-09-18 17:37:27 +03:00
|
|
|
return false if encrypted_password.blank?
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-02 11:18:55 +02:00
|
|
|
super
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-15 16:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
def revoke_access!
|
|
|
|
Doorkeeper::AccessGrant.by_resource_owner(self).update_all(revoked_at: Time.now.utc)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Doorkeeper::AccessToken.by_resource_owner(self).in_batches do |batch|
|
|
|
|
batch.update_all(revoked_at: Time.now.utc)
|
|
|
|
Web::PushSubscription.where(access_token_id: batch).delete_all
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-08 06:31:28 +03:00
|
|
|
def reset_password!
|
2022-01-23 16:46:30 +02:00
|
|
|
# First, change password to something random and deactivate all sessions
|
2021-07-08 06:31:28 +03:00
|
|
|
transaction do
|
2022-01-23 16:46:30 +02:00
|
|
|
update(password: SecureRandom.hex)
|
2021-07-08 06:31:28 +03:00
|
|
|
session_activations.destroy_all
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Then, remove all authorized applications and connected push subscriptions
|
2022-12-15 16:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
revoke_access!
|
2021-07-08 06:31:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Finally, send a reset password prompt to the user
|
|
|
|
send_reset_password_instructions
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-30 16:28:56 +03:00
|
|
|
protected
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
def send_devise_notification(notification, *args, **kwargs)
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
# This method can be called in `after_update` and `after_commit` hooks,
|
|
|
|
# but we must make sure the mailer is actually called *after* commit,
|
|
|
|
# otherwise it may work on stale data. To do this, figure out if we are
|
|
|
|
# within a transaction.
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# It seems like devise sends keyword arguments as a hash in the last
|
|
|
|
# positional argument
|
|
|
|
kwargs = args.pop if args.last.is_a?(Hash) && kwargs.empty?
|
|
|
|
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
if ActiveRecord::Base.connection.current_transaction.try(:records)&.include?(self)
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
pending_devise_notifications << [notification, args, kwargs]
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
render_and_send_devise_message(notification, *args, **kwargs)
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
2017-05-30 16:28:56 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-08 04:32:52 +03:00
|
|
|
private
|
|
|
|
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
def send_pending_devise_notifications
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
pending_devise_notifications.each do |notification, args, kwargs|
|
|
|
|
render_and_send_devise_message(notification, *args, **kwargs)
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Empty the pending notifications array because the
|
|
|
|
# after_commit hook can be called multiple times which
|
|
|
|
# could cause multiple emails to be sent.
|
|
|
|
pending_devise_notifications.clear
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def pending_devise_notifications
|
|
|
|
@pending_devise_notifications ||= []
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-06 15:22:54 +03:00
|
|
|
def render_and_send_devise_message(notification, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
|
|
devise_mailer.send(notification, self, *args, **kwargs).deliver_later
|
Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail (#13475)
* Fix “Email changed” notification sometimes having wrong e-mail
Fixes #6778
The root of the issue is that `send_devise_notification` was called before
the changes were properly commited to the database, causing the mailer to
pick previous values if running too early.
Devise's documentation provides guidance on how to handle that[1][2], however,
I have found it to not be working, as the following happens, in that order:
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `email_changed` notification.
In that case, `changed?` is false and `saved_changes?` is true, so
if we use the former, we have the same issue.
- the `after_commit` hook is called
- `send_devise_notification` is called for the `confirmation_instructions`
notification.
In that case, `changed?` is still false, and `saved_changes?` still true,
so if we use the latter, that second notification email is simply not
going to be sent (as we would be queuing the notification *after*
executing the after_commit hook).
This is because it may be called from either an `after_update` or
`after_commit` hook, the difference not being a call to `save` but the
transaction actually being committed to the database. This may arguably
be a bug in Devise, or Devise's notification.
The proposed workaround is inspired by Devise's documentation but checks
whether a transaction is open to make the call whether to immediately
send the notification or defer it to the `after_commit` hook.
[1]: https://www.rubydoc.info/github/plataformatec/devise/Devise%2FModels%2FAuthenticatable:send_devise_notification
[2]: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/406915cb781e38255a30ad2a0609e33952b9ec50/lib/devise/models/authenticatable.rb#L133-L194
* Fix cases when sending notifications without changing the model
* Defer sending if and only if in transaction including current record
2020-04-15 17:13:44 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def set_approved
|
2020-10-12 17:33:49 +03:00
|
|
|
self.approved = begin
|
2024-01-04 11:07:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if sign_up_from_ip_requires_approval? || sign_up_email_requires_approval?
|
2020-10-12 17:33:49 +03:00
|
|
|
false
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
open_registrations? || valid_invitation? || external?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2024-01-15 13:06:48 +02:00
|
|
|
def grant_approval_on_confirmation?
|
|
|
|
# Re-check approval on confirmation if the server has switched to open registrations
|
|
|
|
open_registrations? && !sign_up_from_ip_requires_approval? && !sign_up_email_requires_approval?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-12 17:33:49 +03:00
|
|
|
def sign_up_from_ip_requires_approval?
|
|
|
|
!sign_up_ip.nil? && IpBlock.where(severity: :sign_up_requires_approval).where('ip >>= ?', sign_up_ip.to_s).exists?
|
2019-03-23 03:23:48 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2024-01-04 11:07:05 +02:00
|
|
|
def sign_up_email_requires_approval?
|
|
|
|
return false unless email.present? || unconfirmed_email.present?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EmailDomainBlock.requires_approval?(email.presence || unconfirmed_email, attempt_ip: sign_up_ip)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-23 03:23:48 +02:00
|
|
|
def open_registrations?
|
|
|
|
Setting.registrations_mode == 'open'
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-25 03:49:25 +03:00
|
|
|
def external?
|
2019-04-28 00:55:16 +03:00
|
|
|
!!@external
|
2019-04-25 03:49:25 +03:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-22 18:14:32 +02:00
|
|
|
def bypass_invite_request_check?
|
|
|
|
@bypass_invite_request_check
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
def sanitize_role
|
2023-11-22 13:38:07 +02:00
|
|
|
self.role = nil if role.present? && role.everyone?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def prepare_new_user!
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
BootstrapTimelineWorker.perform_async(account_id)
|
|
|
|
ActivityTracker.increment('activity:accounts:local')
|
2023-03-06 17:00:08 +02:00
|
|
|
ActivityTracker.record('activity:logins', id)
|
2018-01-18 20:17:25 +02:00
|
|
|
UserMailer.welcome(self).deliver_later
|
2023-01-05 14:29:49 +02:00
|
|
|
TriggerWebhookWorker.perform_async('account.approved', 'Account', account_id)
|
2017-12-29 20:52:04 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def prepare_returning_user!
|
2023-03-06 17:00:08 +02:00
|
|
|
return unless confirmed?
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
ActivityTracker.record('activity:logins', id)
|
|
|
|
regenerate_feed! if needs_feed_update?
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def notify_staff_about_pending_account!
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
User.those_who_can(:manage_users).includes(:account).find_each do |u|
|
2019-04-10 01:35:49 +03:00
|
|
|
next unless u.allows_pending_account_emails?
|
2023-02-20 07:58:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-07-08 21:03:38 +03:00
|
|
|
AdminMailer.with(recipient: u.account).new_pending_account(self).deliver_later
|
2019-03-14 06:28:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
def regenerate_feed!
|
2022-04-28 18:47:34 +03:00
|
|
|
RegenerationWorker.perform_async(account_id) if redis.set("account:#{account_id}:regeneration", true, nx: true, ex: 1.day.seconds)
|
2018-01-23 21:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def needs_feed_update?
|
|
|
|
last_sign_in_at < ACTIVE_DURATION.ago
|
|
|
|
end
|
2018-12-10 23:53:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def validate_email_dns?
|
2023-11-07 12:44:15 +02:00
|
|
|
email_changed? && !external? && !Rails.env.local?
|
2018-12-10 23:53:25 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2020-12-22 18:14:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-07-05 03:41:40 +03:00
|
|
|
def validate_role_elevation
|
|
|
|
errors.add(:role_id, :elevated) if defined?(@current_account) && role&.overrides?(@current_account&.user_role)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-22 18:14:32 +02:00
|
|
|
def invite_text_required?
|
2022-12-07 17:39:58 +02:00
|
|
|
Setting.require_invite_text && !open_registrations? && !invited? && !external? && !bypass_invite_request_check?
|
2020-12-22 18:14:32 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2022-06-09 22:57:36 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def trigger_webhooks
|
|
|
|
TriggerWebhookWorker.perform_async('account.created', 'Account', account_id)
|
|
|
|
end
|
2016-02-22 17:00:20 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|